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“Me Too”: Epistemic Injustice and the Struggle for Recognition1 





Congdon (2017), Giladi (2018), and McConkey (2004) challenge feminist 
epistemologists and recognition theorists to come together to analyze epistemic 
injustice. I take up this challenge by highlighting the failure of recognition in cases of 
testimonial and hermeneutical injustice experienced by victims of sexual 
harassment and sexual assault. I offer the #MeToo movement as a case study to 
demonstrate how the process of mutual recognition makes visible and helps 
overcome the epistemic injustice suffered by victims of sexual harassment and 
sexual assault. I argue that in declaring “me too,” the epistemic subject emerges in 
the context of a polyphonic symphony of victims claiming their status as agents who 
are able to make sense of their own social experiences and able to convey their 
knowledge to others. 
 
 





In its December 18, 2017, issue, Time magazine declared “The Silence 
Breakers” as the “2017 Person of the Year.” The article features stories from 35 
women and men who had suffered from sexual harassment and/or sexual assault in 
a variety of occupations, from Hollywood actors, prominent journalists, and political 
lobbyists to hotel housekeepers, restaurant dishwashers, and office assistants. The 
honor bestowed on “The Silence Breakers” was, in part, sparked by a symphony of 
                                                          
1 I am grateful that the research and writing of this essay were supported by the 
NEH Summer Institute on Diverse Philosophical Approaches to Sexual Violence held 
at Elon University in June 2017, a one-semester sabbatical funded by California State 
University, Bakersfield, and a mini-grant from CSUB’s Research Council of the 
University during fall 2017. I also appreciate the comments and suggestions offered 
by the anonymous reviewer from Feminist Philosophy Quarterly, and I am indebted 
to my colleagues Senem Saner and Steven Gamboa for their encouragement and 
comments on drafts of this paper. 
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“me too” declarations across the world, which began on October 15, 2017, when 
actress Alyssa Milano posted on her Twitter account, 
 
Me Too. Suggested by a friend: “If all the women who have been sexually 
harassed or assaulted wrote ‘Me too.’ as a status, we might give people a 
sense of the magnitude of the problem.” If you’ve been sexually harassed or 
assaulted write ‘me too’ as a reply to this tweet. 
 
The response was overwhelming. Milano told Time that she received 32,000 replies 
to her tweet within 24 hours (Zacharek, Dockterman, and Sweetland Edwards 2017, 
32). CNN reported that 4.7 million people engaged in the “me too” conversation on 
Twitter, with over 12 million posts, comments, and reactions in the first 24 hours 
after Milano’s post (Santiago and Criss 2017). “Me too” statements also flooded 
other social media platforms including Facebook and Instagram. Some of the posts 
were a simple “me too,” while others included descriptions of the incidents that the 
writers endured. Although #MeToo as a social media phenomenon appeared at the 
end of 2017, “me too” as a social movement has a much longer history. Tarana 
Burke, founder of the youth organization Just Be Inc., is widely credited as the 
originator of the “me too” movement beginning in 2006. 
#MeToo is not the first social media campaign aimed at drawing attention to 
sexual harassment and sexual assault. In 2011, photography student Grace Brown 
created Project Unbreakable, a website featuring photographs of survivors of sexual 
assault, domestic violence, and child abuse holding signs which quote their attackers 
or those to whom they had disclosed their experience. In 2012, activist Laura Bates 
launched the #EverydaySexism campaign, which catalogs stories of sexism from 
around the world, including experiences of sexual harassment and sexual assault. In 
2014, #YesAllWomen was widely posted to raise awareness about violence against 
women after a misogyny-driven killing spree in Isla Vista, California. In 2016, 
#NotOkay drew attention to rape culture following the release of the Access 
Hollywood video in which Donald Trump bragged about groping women. And, in 
response to the October 5, 2017, New York Times article about Harvey Weinstein’s 
long history of sexual misconduct (Kantor and Twohey 2017), #MyHarveyWeinstein 
appeared as individuals shared their own stories of sexual harassment in the 
workplace. 
However, #MeToo differs from previous campaigns to raise awareness about 
sexual harassment and sexual violence, and that difference is not just about the 
numbers of people across the globe who have participated in the conversation. The 
difference can be illuminated by drawing on two lines of scholarship: work in 
feminist social epistemology on epistemic injustice and work in social philosophy on 
the role of recognition in the development of self-identity. In this essay, I argue that 
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“me too” is more than a strategy for “giving people a sense of the magnitude of the 
problem;” it simultaneously makes visible the epistemic injustice suffered by victims 
of sexual harassment and sexual violence, and helps overcome that injustice 
through a process of mutual recognition. To make this case, I describe the 
recognitive failures of testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice, and argue 
that in declaring “me too,” the epistemic subject emerges in the context of a 
polyphonic symphony of victims claiming their status as agents who are both able to 
make sense of their own social experiences and able to convey their knowledge to 
others.  
 
Epistemic Injustice and Recognition Theory 
While the term “epistemic injustice” itself highlights the intersection of 
epistemology, ethics, and political theory, the literature has focused primarily on 
epistemic questions rather than questions of justice. For example, in the 
introduction to her 2007 book, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, 
Miranda Fricker distinguishes her focus from political concerns about “distributive 
unfairness in respect to epistemic goods such as information or education” (Fricker 
2007, 1). Unfortunately, this remark misses the fact that questions of justice are 
more than a matter of the distribution of goods, as recognition theorists have 
argued (Young 1990; C. Taylor 1994; Honneth 1995). In contrast, Congdon (2017), 
Giladi (2018), and McConkey (2004) insist that feminist epistemologists and 
recognition theorists join theoretical forces in analyzing epistemic injustice. 
On the one hand, Matthew Congdon and Paul Giladi argue that social 
epistemologists working on epistemic injustice ought to pay attention to recognition 
theory. In “What’s Wrong with Epistemic Injustice? Harm, Vice, Objectification, 
Misrecognition,” Congdon contends that the wrongness of epistemic injustice is not 
only a matter of harmful consequences, vicious perception, and objectification; it is 
also a matter of misrecognition. Because a person’s self-identity is both developed 
and maintained through relations with others, epistemic injustice undermines a 
positive relation-to-self through the denial of one’s standing as a knower. That is, 
epistemic injustice is a failure of recognition. Like Congdon, Paul Giladi also argues 
that recognition theory can help diagnose the wrongness of epistemic injustice. In 
his essay, “Epistemic Injustice: A Role for Recognition?” Giladi describes how both 
testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice are failures of recognition. The 
former entails denying a speaker the status of a rational enquirer, which alienates 
her from her own rationality and excludes her from the community of rational 
enquirers. The latter entails preventing members of marginalized groups from 
accessing the self-interpretational dimension of rational agency, which maintains 
existing ideological structures and prevents radical social change. 
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Giladi further considers how recognition theory can help identify ways to 
overcome epistemic injustice. He writes, “The practice of overcoming epistemic 
unsociability and realizing our epistemic sociability seems to share much in common 
with the process of transitioning from asymmetrical recognition orders to genuinely 
symmetrical recognition orders, since true sociality does not merely consist in 
interacting with others simpliciter, but rather in interacting with others in a way that 
enables self-realization” (Giladi 2018, 149; italics in original). That is, epistemic 
justice and mutual recognition are mutually supporting. To treat a person with 
epistemic respect is to recognize that person as one’s peer, and this supports 
his/her/their2 status as a rational agent. Giladi points to consciousness-raising 
initiatives and solidarity movements as potential examples of symmetrical cognitive 
environments in which testimonial justice is possible. He also suggests that while 
hermeneutical justice is difficult under oppressive social conditions, attempts to 
shift unequal power relations can result in progressive gains. 
Jane McConkey, on the other hand, argues that recognition theorists ought 
to pay attention to the phenomenon of epistemic injustice. In “Knowledge and 
Acknowledgement: Epistemic Injustice as a Problem of Recognition,” she links 
epistemic injustice to forms of oppression such as cultural imperialism. Because 
cultural imperialism involves the misrepresentation of marginalized groups and the 
ongoing misunderstanding of that group’s social identity, it is widely accepted as a 
problem of recognition (Young 1990). However, she maintains, cultural imperialism 
can also be understood as involving epistemic injustice. Although she doesn’t use 
the terms hermeneutical injustice and testimonial injustice, her description of the 
injustice committed by cultural imperialism entails both concepts. This is because 
marginalized groups are denied the opportunity to contribute to the collective 
epistemic resources, given that only the dominant group’s cultural products are 
regarded as valuable and thus universally representative of the human experience. 
McConkey describes the paradox faced by members of oppressed groups: “They are 
understood in terms of crude stereotypes that do not accurately portray individual 
group members but also assume a mask of invisibility; they are both badly 
misrepresented and robbed of the means by which to express their perspective” 
(McConkey 2004, 202). 
Recognition theory has much to offer critical social epistemology: it can help 
diagnose interpersonal acts of testimonial injustice; it can help diagnose political 
relations supporting testimonial and hermeneutical injustice; and it can help identify 
remedies for epistemic injustice. In the following sections, I highlight the recognitive 
failures in cases of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice experienced by victims of 
sexual harassment and sexual assault, and characterize the #MeToo movement as a 
                                                          
2 For the remainder of this essay, I will use the pronouns “she,” “her,” and “hers.” 
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performance of mutual recognition which both reclaims a victim’s status as an 
epistemic subject and builds a community of solidarity. 
 
Testimonial Injustice and the Struggle for Recognition 
The role of testimony in the recovery of the self following a traumatic event 
is often emphasized in trauma studies scholarship (although usually put in terms of 
narrative rather than testimony to highlight the agency of the testifier). Susan Brison 
(1999, 2002), for example, argues that self-narration is a process of re-
subjectification. In narrating one’s own experience, the victim shifts from the status 
of an object to that of a subject, resulting in the restoration of both the victim’s 
sense of self and her membership in a community of selves. Recovery of the self 
after a traumatic event requires, then, the ability to authoritatively tell one’s story, 
to testify about what one has experienced. It also requires a recognitive response to 
that testimony. I argue that when that recognition is mutual, when it occurs 
between two (or more) victims, the restorative potential of testimony is more fully 
achieved. 
When victims of sexual harassment and sexual assault disclose their 
experiences, some are believed, but many are not. The credibility of their testimony 
greatly depends upon their social identity and the nature of the incident. That is, the 
credibility of a victim’s testimony depends upon the “rhetorical space” in which it is 
uttered. Lorraine Code (1995) uses the term “rhetorical spaces” to characterize 
“fictive but not fanciful or fixed locations, whose (tacit, rarely spoken) territorial 
imperatives structure and limit the kinds of utterances that can be voiced within 
them with a reasonable expectation of uptake and ‘choral support’: an expectation 
of being heard, understood, taken seriously. They are the sites where the very 
possibility of an utterance counting as ‘true-or-false’ or of a discussion yielding 
insight is made manifest” (Code 1995, ix–x). The rhetorical spaces in which a victim’s 
testimony is expressed are shaped by social scripts, attitudes, stereotypes, and 
discourses which are culturally and historically situated. 
When it comes to experiences of sexual harassment and sexual assault, the 
testimony that elicits social and legal response is generally restricted to that which 
conforms to social scripts about legitimate victims. For example, affluent white 
women who are sexually assaulted by strangers and suffer substantial injuries are 
the most likely to be believed. Their experience fits the model of “real rape.” But 
those whose experiences do not conform to the model of “real rape” are those 
which are denied uptake and choral support. Women who are sexually assaulted by 
acquaintances are unlikely to be believed due to the wide acceptance of rape 
supportive attitudes. These include the views that women frequently lie about being 
raped to draw attention to themselves, to protect their reputation as chaste, or to 
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enact revenge when a relationship fails.3 Women of color who are sexually assaulted 
are unlikely to be believed due to racialized gender stereotypes. Black women, for 
example, are subject to what Patricia Hill Collins (1990) identifies as “controlling 
images of Black womanhood,” namely the mammy, matriarch, welfare mother, and 
Jezebel, which situate them as either unsexed thus unrapable or else oversexed thus 
unrapable. Similar social scripts are at work with respect to sexual harassment. 
Women’s reports of sexual harassment are frequently met with incredulity for many 
of the same reasons as are reports of sexual assault (Lonsway, Cortina, and Magely 
2008). In some cases, the inappropriate behavior is acknowledged, but the woman’s 
report is discounted on the basis that she failed to understand the nature of the 
behavior: the victim’s offense is attributed to her being oversensitive and unable to 
“take a joke.” In other cases, the inappropriate behavior is denied altogether, and 
the victim is accused of lying to gain attention, to seek revenge, or to profit 
financially. Men who are sexually harassed or sexually assaulted are also unlikely to 
be believed due to gendered social scripts. Wendy Hollway (1989) identifies “male 
sexual drive discourse” as having a pervasive influence on attitudes about male 
sexuality. According to this script, men have an overwhelming desire or need to 
have sex, which translates not only into justification when men perpetrate sexual 
harassment or sexual assault, but also translates into the impossibility that a man 
could be victimized. Hegemonic masculinity is equated with potency and 
impermeability, not sexual victimization. 
Each of the situations described above involve testimonial injustice. Miranda 
Fricker defines testimonial injustice as a distinctively epistemic harm that “occurs 
when prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s 
word” (Fricker 2007, 1). Victims of sexual harassment or sexual assault are perceived 
as lacking credibility due to the wide acceptance of rape-supportive attitudes, 
racialized gender stereotypes, sexual harassment myths, and gendered social 
scripts. Fricker points out that these prejudices operate through the collective social 
imagination, distorting the hearer’s perception of the speaker at the nondoxastic 
level. That is, these prejudices may operate in ways that may be inconsistent with 
                                                          
3 One of the most debated issues regarding sexual violence is the frequency of false 
allegations. In 2006, criminal justice professor Philip Rumney published a 
comprehensive review of studies and reports on false rape allegations, finding 
estimates ranging from 1.5% to 90% (Rumney 2006). Psychologist David Lisak and 
colleagues argue that few of the sources included in Rumney’s review are credible. 
They argue that when considering only credible studies—those which clearly define 
what constitutes a false report, clearly explain the source data used, and evaluate 
the data received from law enforcement agencies—the prevalence of false 
allegations is between 2% and 10% (Lisak et al. 2010).  
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the conscious beliefs of hearers. Hearers perceive women and men who report 
sexual harassment or sexual assault as dishonest, even at the same time as they 
might deny conscious adherence to rape myths. The pervasive and powerful 
influence of these prejudices on the social perception of victims is captured by the 
term “rape culture.” 
For many victims, particularly those whose experiences do not fit the 
expectations for credible reports, testimonial injustice can be exacerbated by 
“epistemic violence,” the pervasive silencing of marginalized groups. Kristie Dotson 
(2011) distinguishes between two of these practices of silencing, namely 
“testimonial quieting” and “testimonial smothering.” On the one hand, testimonial 
quieting refers to practices in which a speaker’s testimony is silenced due to the 
hearer’s failure to identify her as a knower. The credibility of victims who are 
members of epistemically marginalized groups is systematically undermined already, 
thus their testimony of victimization has little chance to gain uptake. On the other 
hand, testimonial smothering refers to practices in which a speaker engages in self-
silencing due to the hearer’s incompetence. In these cases, victims are effectively 
coerced into silence because to testify to their victimization would risk future harm 
to themselves. In both cases, the victim is perceived as dishonest and as an 
unreliable source of knowledge. 
The effects of testimonial injustice on victims of sexual harassment and 
sexual assault are profound. To be denied the status of a “genuine victim” is to be 
denied access to the emotional, social, medical, and legal responses that status 
warrants (Burt and Estep 1981). Instead of receiving sympathy, hearers respond to 
victims with hostility, which can be particularly painful when coming from loved 
ones to whom one typically turns to for support. Instead of receiving social support, 
victims become socially isolated and ostracized. They are left to attempt to cope 
with the harm they endure on their own, or to try to locate limited services from 
organizations such as rape crisis centers. Instead of being able to access medical 
care or legal recourse, victims are rejected by those professionals sworn to advocate 
on the behalf of the vulnerable. Even when a report is filed with human resources or 
the police, the case is rarely prosecuted. And for those who undergo a sexual assault 
examination kit, the evidence is unlikely to be analyzed as rape kits sit in storage for 
decades (Mulla 2014). As a result, most victims forgo reporting their victimization to 
authorities. For example, only 6% to 13% of those who experience sexual 
harassment in the workplace file complaints (Cortina and Berdahl 2008), and only 
31% of attempted and completed rapes are reported to police (L. Taylor 2006). This 
indicates the extent to which testimonial smothering affects victims of sexual 
harassment and/or sexual assault. In the face of an incompetent audience unwilling 
and unable to hear one’s testimony, victims suffer in silence. 
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Above all, to be denied the status of a “genuine victim” is to be denied 
recognition as an epistemic subject. When hearers respond to a victim’s testimony 
with incredulity, they deny her the status of someone who can authoritatively speak 
to the facts of the events she endured, and deny her the status of someone who 
others can rely upon to gain knowledge about the world. Thus, testimonial injustice 
alienates the speaker from both her own self-relation and her relation to others. Her 
diminished status also erodes her self-confidence in being able to effect change to 
the social environment that produced her victimization. If she is not believed, she is 
less likely to be able to improve her working conditions or living situation. She may, 
herself, come to accept the judgment that she is at fault, that her actions 
precipitated the incident(s), or that she deserved the harm she suffered. This is 
particularly true for victims of sexual harassment and sexual assault. A sexual 
predator, in committing a crime against a person, attacks the victim in her capacity 
as a subject, refusing to recognize her as an individual agent with her own life plans, 
projects, and perspective. When a victim discloses her experience to another 
person, her status as a subject is on the line. If the hearer responds with disbelief, 
her diminished status is reinforced.  
All this points to the fact that testimony calls for an empathic response. 
Because the self is relational, narrating one’s experience cannot be monological; it 
must be shared with and heard by others even if those others are imagined, 
potential others. The ability to interpret and represent one’s own experience 
requires an audience, someone to whom and for whom the narrative can be told. 
Dori Laub writes, “The absence of an empathic listener, or more radically, the 
absence of an addressable other, an other who can hear the anguish of one’s 
memories and thus affirm and recognize their realness, annihilates the story” (Laub 
1992, 68). Without uptake and choral support, that is, without recognition, 
testimony cannot accomplish its intention, namely to convey knowledge to others. 
Brison captures how the need for an empathic listener is particularly critical for 
victims who are traumatized by their experiences. She writes, “In order to construct 
self-narratives we need not only the words with which to tell our stories, but also an 
audience able and willing to hear us and to understand our words as we intend 
them. This aspect of remaking a self in the aftermath of trauma highlights the 
dependency of the self on others and helps to explain why it is so difficult for 
survivors to recover when others are unwilling to listen to what they endured” 
(Brison 1999, 46).  
To counter the testimonial injustice experienced by many victims of sexual 
harassment and sexual assault, two common responses from empathic listeners are 
“I believe you” and “That should not have happened to you.” These responses are 
recognitive acts and powerful indictments of rape culture. In taking up a victim’s 
testimony as true, the former recognizes her as an epistemic subject, as someone 
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capable of understanding her own experience and contributing her knowledge to 
the collective epistemic resources. The latter expresses moral outrage for the injury 
that the victim experienced, affirming her rights to bodily integrity and autonomy. 
Thus, these responses affirm the victim’s positive relation-to-self as both an 
epistemic and moral subject. I do not intend to contest the appropriateness of these 
responses to hearing a victim’s disclosure of sexual harassment or sexual assault. 
However, I do want to note that both “I believe you” and “That should not have 
happened to you” pose a risk of reinscribing the victim’s disempowerment. They 
posit the hearer-respondent as the epistemic and moral authority, as the subject 
capable of making a judgment on the veracity of the testimony and the 
wrongfulness of the deed. These recognitive responses thus create an asymmetrical 
relationship between the victim-testifier and the hearer-respondent, in which the 
latter’s validation as a subject depends upon the former’s judgment. 
In The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflict (1995), 
Axel Honneth argues that the development and maintenance of a positive self-
relation is grounded not on an asymmetrical process of recognition but on an 
intersubjective process of mutual recognition. He writes, “The very possibility of 
identity-formation depends crucially on the development of self-confidence, self-
respect, and self-esteem. These three modes of relating practically to oneself can 
only be acquired and maintained intersubjectively, through being granted 
recognition by others whom one also recognizes. As a result, the conditions for self-
realization turn out to be dependent on the establishment of relationships of mutual 
recognition” (Honneth 1995, xi). Unlike “I believe you” and “That should not have 
happened to you,” “me too” creates a symmetrical relationship between the victim 
and the listener since the act of recognition simultaneously reverses the roles of 
victim-testifier and hearer-respondent. When I respond to another’s testimony with 
“me too,” I am both testifying and recognizing her testimony, and my recognition of 
her as a victim is dependent upon her recognition of me as a victim. The “too” in the 
response is the central feature of the moment of mutual recognition. When I 
respond “me too,” I not only recognize her as reliable testifier, I also expose myself 
as a victim and make myself vulnerable to her judgment about my testimony. Our 
mutual vulnerability empowers each other as both epistemic and moral agents.  
 
Hermeneutical Injustice and the Struggle for Recognition 
Being able to narrate one’s experience of victimization requires the 
hermeneutical resources with which to characterize the events as harmful or 
injurious. But these interpretive resources are not always available. In some cases, 
this is a matter of circumstantial bad luck, but in others it is a result of a systematic 
prejudice regarding which social groups have the authority to interpret the world. 
Fricker identifies this phenomenon as hermeneutical injustice, namely, a distinct 
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form of epistemic injustice occurring “when a gap in collective interpretive 
resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense 
of their own social experiences” (Fricker 2007, 1). 
One of Fricker's central examples of hermeneutical injustice is taken from 
Susan Brownmiller's memoir, In Our Time: Memoir of a Revolution (1999), in which 
she recounts how the phenomenon of sexual harassment appeared on the feminist 
agenda. It begins with the story of Carmita Wood, who had worked at Cornell 
University for eight years. Wood endured unwanted sexual attention from one of 
the professors at the university. His behavior included jiggling his crotch when he 
stood near her desk, brushing against her breasts when reaching for papers, and 
cornering her in an elevator to kiss her. The stress from these encounters led to a 
host of physical ailments including chronic back pain and neck pain, so Wood left her 
job and filed for unemployment insurance. However, Brownmiller writes, "When the 
claims investigator asked why she had left her job after eight years, Wood was at a 
loss to describe the hateful episodes. . . . Her claim for unemployment benefits was 
denied" (Brownmiller 1999, 280–281). Because this incident occurred prior to 1975, 
Wood lacked the interpretive resources necessary to identify her experience as a 
form of sex discrimination which we now identify as sexual harassment. As a result, 
Fricker argues, Wood suffered hermeneutical injustice. 
Like testimonial injustice, hermeneutical injustice also involves a failure of 
recognition. Giladi writes, “The principle harmfulness of hermeneutical injustice 
consists in depriving a victim of having access to the self-interpretational dimension 
of rational agency: this represents a specific variety of alienation, because an 
indispensable feature of rational agency is one’s ability to make sense of one’s 
experiences” (Giladi 2018, 152 italics in original). Victims of hermeneutical injustice 
do not just accidently lack the concepts to understand their experiences; they are 
systematically denied the epistemic authority to interpret their own experiences. 
Charles Mills characterizes this succinctly: “It is not a matter of an innocent 
misunderstanding or gap, but of a misrepresentation generated organically, 
materially, from the male perspective on the world, motivated by their group 
interests and phenomenologically supported by their group experience” (Mills 2017, 
105). The phenomenon of what we now recognize as sexual harassment is highly 
gendered and differentially impacts men and women. The historical absence of this 
concept is determined by the parameters of the existent rhetorical spaces. Women’s 
social subordination to men both produces and is reinforced by their unequal ability 
to participate in the shaping of dominant interpretive resources (Fricker 2007, 152). 
When women are not fully recognized as epistemic subjects who are both equal 
members of the epistemic community and at the same time subjects whose 
experiences of the world are different from that of men, their subjectivity is not only 
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devalued, it is given no value at all. In other words, the failure of recognition is one 
of nonrecognition, not just misrecognition. 
Hermeneutical injustice can, then, be attributed to the pervasive power of 
ideology, what in common parlance is referred to as “rape culture.” Unfortunately, 
this hegemonic worldview is often internalized by those whose experiences flatly 
contradict the prevailing interpretations (Mills 2017, 102). For example, psychologist 
Lynn M. Phillips (2000) has documented how young women from diverse 
backgrounds frequently describe experiences that fit the legal definition of rape, 
battering, or harassment, yet do not define them as such. When a victim internalizes 
rape myths that blame victims for eliciting the assault, deny that a person with a 
particular social identity can be raped, or excuse perpetrators for being at the whim 
of “evolutionary drives,” she will be unable to understand her own experience of 
victimization. In “Rape Myths and Domestic Abuse Myths as Hermeneutical 
Injustices” (2017), Katherine Jenkins argues that this constitutes a kind of 
hermeneutical injustice. Instead of attributing a victim’s understanding of herself as 
a result of her failure to make use of the interpretive resources available (e.g., legal 
definitions) that would warrant seeing herself as a victim, Jenkins insists that these 
conceptual resources are genuinely not at her disposal. This is because there is a 
conflict between the meaning of the concepts at the formal, policy level and those 
at the everyday level of practice. The rhetorical space of “rape culture” produces 
failures of recognition, and these failures can be both the inability of a victim to 
recognize herself as well as the inability of others to recognize her as a victim.  
Interestingly, what makes hermeneutical injustice visible is its overcoming 
through an intersubjective process of mutual recognition. It is through the collective 
efforts of those who are hermeneutically marginalized that a gap in the economy of 
interpretive resources is exposed and filled. To see this, let’s return to the case of 
Carmita Wood. Brownmiller credits the emergence of the term “sexual harassment” 
to a group of eight women working in Cornell University’s Human Affairs office who 
were discussing how to raise awareness not only about Wood’s experience but also 
the experiences of other women, including those in Lin Farley’s seminar on “women 
and work.” Because Wood’s experience was identified as just one example among 
many, it could be situated as a result of a larger social pathology. Farley’s colleague, 
Karen Sauvigne, described to Brownmiller the recognitive moment: 
 
“Lin’s students had been talking in her seminar about the unwanted sexual 
advances they’d encountered on their summer jobs,” Sauvigne relates. “And 
then Carmita Wood comes in and tells Lin her story. We realized that to a 
person, every one of us—the women on staff, Carmita, the students—had 
had an experience like this at some point, you know? And none of us had 
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ever told anyone before. It was one of those click, aha! moments, a profound 
revelation.” (Brownmiller 1999, 281) 
 
The women decided to hold a “speak-out” in order to “break the silence” about 
their collective experiences but needed a name to advertise the event. After some 
brainstorming, the term “sexual harassment” was coined. The ability of the women 
to identify the gap in the collective hermeneutical resources and to fill it with a new 
concept depended upon a process of mutual recognition in which women who had 
been targeted by predatory coworkers or bosses were able to see themselves as 
victims by seeing the others as victims.  
Note that if the response to Carmita Wood’s testimony had been simply “I 
believe you” or “That should not have happened to you,” the rhetorical space for 
the emergence of collective action to protest the harm she endured would not have 
been possible. Although “I believe you” and “That should not have happened to 
you” leave open the risk for enacting an asymmetrical relationship in which the 
hearer-respondent is the epistemic and moral authority, these responses also 
preserve the isolation of the victim-testifier, or rather the potential victim-testifier 
since, so long as she is solitary, she can continue to understand her experience as 
natural, inevitable, or deserved. Honneth argues that in order for members of 
subordinated groups to understand the profound disrespect they experience to be 
something they encounter not simply as individuals but in virtue of their 
membership in that social group, they need a semantics with which to articulate and 
protest it. He writes, “As soon as ideas of this sort have gained influence within a 
society, they generate a subcultural horizon of interpretation within which 
experiences of disrespect that, previously, had been fragmented and had been 
coped with privately can then become the moral motives for a collective ‘struggle 
for recognition’” (Honneth 1995, 164). Without an intersubjective process of mutual 
recognition, Wood would have lacked the opportunity to understand her experience 
as shared, as a part of a group whose members are similarly situated and thus suffer 
similar harms. Honneth states this clearly: “One can count as the bearer of rights of 
some kind only if one is socially recognized as a member of a community” (Honneth 
1995, 109). 
Throughout her memoir, Brownmiller describes numerous “speak-outs” 
aimed at “breaking the silence” about a variety of issues facing women, including 
ones on abortion, rape, and sexual abuse. These “speak-outs” are public testimonies 
of victims’ experiences aimed to demonstrate that these experiences are not 
isolated incidents but part of a pervasive social pathology. In each of these cases, 
consciousness-raising plays a big part. Brownmiller defines consciousness-raising as 
the process of “bringing submerged truths to the surface, where I learned that I 
wasn’t alone” (Brownmiller 1999, 7). In sharing one’s own experience with abortion, 
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rape, sexual abuse, or sexual harassment in the context of others who share their 
stories, victims experience “me too” moments, which allow them to discover that 
their suffering is not a “personal problem,” but is instead a result of a larger system 
of oppression. That is, “me too” launches the realization that the personal is 
political. As a result, new hermeneutical resources emerge, allowing for the 
recognition of a variety of forms of sexual misconduct which were previously 
obscured. These include, for example, the now familiar terms date rape, 
acquaintance rape, marital rape, and male rape. 
 
#MeToo: Empowerment through Empathy 
Thus far, I have argued that both testimonial injustice and hermeneutical 
injustice are failures of recognition, and that a process of mutual recognition, 
embodied in the response “me too,” offers a restorative response to epistemic 
injustice at both the interpersonal and collective level. On the one hand, “me too” as 
a response to testimonial injustice works at the intersubjective level to establish the 
epistemic and moral agency of victims through a process of mutual recognition. On 
the other hand, “me too” as a response to hermeneutical injustice works at the 
social/collective level to create new concepts to name the harms experienced by 
members of the group. In this final section, I consider the political potential of “me 
too” as a social movement, arguing that the stream of “me too” statements across 
the world inscribe both the victim-testifiers and the hearer-respondents into a 
community of others who are able to mutually sympathize with each other and 
work to raise the esteem of themselves as a collective group. I also consider some of 
the potential pitfalls facing the movement. 
The process of mutual recognition embodied in “me too” creates the 
groundwork necessary for a political movement. By recognizing the epistemic and 
moral agency of its members and then generating new concepts to name the harms 
experienced by its members, “me too” is positioned to become #MeToo, a political 
movement uniting victims in solidarity to work toward cultural change. It is a public 
struggle demanding widespread attention and aimed at elevating the status of the 
group. This requires recognizing the distinct features of the group as different yet 
worthy of equal esteem, rather than erasing the group’s differences through 
assimilation. Honneth writes, “The more successful social movements are at drawing 
the public sphere’s attention to the neglected significance of the traits and abilities 
they collectively represent, the better their chances of raising the social worth, or 
indeed, the standing of their members” (Honneth 1995, 127). In the case of sexual 
harassment and sexual assault, the experience of victims provides evidence 
challenging the social scripts, attitudes, stereotypes, and discourses that comprise 
“rape culture.” One of #MeToo’s aims, then, is to reconfigure the rhetorical space so 
that these insights can be expressed and heard.  
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As of the writing of this essay, #MeToo has garnered significant uptake and 
choral support. Time’s recognition of “The Silence Breakers” as the “2017 Person of 
the Year” indicates the success of the #MeToo movement in attracting the public 
attention it needs to effect change. The magazine provides the victims a stage upon 
which to speak (the magazine) and invites an audience (its readers) to listen to their 
testimony. In that sense, #MeToo is a successful act of defiance, both as a challenge 
to the epistemic injustice faced by victims and as a way to “put a face” to the 
statistics confirming the widespread prevalence of sexual harassment and sexual 
assault. It is also notable that Time names “The Silence Breakers” as the “2017 
Person of the Year.” Conferring the status of a person on this group of women and 
men must be understood as an act of recognition that raises the esteem of the 
group and its members. Although the members of this group have been 
epistemically marginalized insofar as they have been pressured to remain silent via 
testimonial smothering, or if they have not been silent, their speech has landed on 
unresponsive ears via testimonial quieting, to honor them in this way is to recognize 
that their experiences have an important contribution to make to understanding the 
world. Importantly, “The Silence Breakers” are not a homogenous group. The 35 
women and men featured in the article come from diverse socioeconomic and 
racial/ethnic backgrounds and work in a wide range of different occupations. This 
diverse yet harmonious chorus of voices works in concert to create a movement for 
social change. They not only represent those typically recognized as “legitimate 
victims,” but also those whose experiences are often excluded in dominant 
narratives. Thus, the article creates a counternarrative to the usual testimonial 
injustice victims face.  
There are, of course, dangers to this kind of public recognition. The call for 
victims to expose themselves as victims through public declarations of “me too” 
risks enacting a confessional culture. In The History of Sexuality: Volume I: An 
Introduction (1990), Michel Foucault highlights how power operates through the 
rituals of confession. He writes, “One does not confess without the presence (or 
virtual presence) of a partner who is not simply the interlocutor but the authority 
who requires the confession, prescribes and appreciates it, and intervenes in order 
to judge, punish, forgive, console, and reconcile; a ritual in which the truth is 
corroborated by the obstacles and resistances it has had to surmount in order to be 
formulated; and finally, a ritual in which the expression alone, independently of its 
external consequences, produces intrinsic modifications in the person who 
articulates it” (Foucault 1990, 61–62). It is this ritual of confession that reinforces 
testimonial injustice faced by victims of sexual harassment and sexual assault, and 
captures why “I believe you” and “That should not have happened to you” as 
responses from a hearer can, under certain conditions, be disempowering. When 
the rhetorical space situates hearers-respondents as the epistemic and moral 
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authority, the victim-testifier is made more vulnerable. #MeToo also threatens to 
create a spectacle of victims’ experiences. In “Survivor Discourse: Transgression or 
Recuperation?” (1993), Linda Alcoff and Laura Gray expose the ways that victim 
testimony has been co-opted through television talk shows, which sensationalize 
and exploit their narratives for public entertainment. As a result, the transgressive 
potential of victim testimony is undermined. Rather than victims speaking for 
themselves as epistemic and moral authorities, they are “reified purely as objects, in 
need of expert interpretation, psychiatric help, and audience sympathy” (Alcoff and 
Gray 1993, 278). 
Although rituals of confession and spectacles of suffering are real threats to 
the success of #MeToo as a political movement, its grounding in a process of mutual 
recognition resists these dangers. “Me too” establishes a symmetrical relationship 
between the victim-testifier and the hearer-respondent, in which mutual 
vulnerability and mutual authority to interpret and judge are recognized. In this way, 
victims are not reified as objects; they are empowered to speak on their own behalf, 
not needing the expert interpretation of a medical or legal authority figure. By 
building a community of solidarity among each other, they are able to generate 
interpretive resources grounded in their own experience and supported by the 
experience of others who are similarly situated. This process of mutual recognition is 
critical because agency is something that must be claimed, not given, if it is to avoid 
undermining itself.  
Some critics have expressed concern that #MeToo’s operation outside of the 
bonds of formal, legal processes for investigating and prosecuting cases of sexual 
harassment and sexual assault constitutes a violation of due process for those 
accused. When victims post #MeToo on social media platforms such as Twitter, 
Facebook, Instagram, and public blogs, they often describe their experiences and/or 
name particular individuals as the perpetrators. These accusations can unfairly 
damage reputations and livelihoods. For example, Harvey Weinstein, Kevin Spacey, 
and Louis C.K. were all fired following allegations of, not prosecution for, sexual 
assault. Margaret Atwood cautions that this “understandable and temporary 
vigilante justice can morph into a culturally solidified lynch-mob habit, in which the 
available mode of justice is thrown out the window, and extralegal power structures 
are put into place and maintained” (Atwood 2018). 
It’s true that the failure of the legal system to effectively respond to and 
deter sexual harassment and sexual assault has inspired some victims to look for 
extra-legal solutions such as publicly exposing perpetrators. For example, the same 
month that Alyssa Milano’s call for #MeToo posts on Twitter, Moira Donegan 
created an anonymous, crowdsourced spreadsheet, “Shitty Media Men,” which 
listed more than 70 men accused of sexual misconduct before it was taken offline 12 
hours later (Donegan 2018). Donegan admits that although it was not her intention, 
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the spreadsheet could be used to inflict consequences on those named as 
perpetrators. She notes that investigations have been conducted into some of the 
men listed on the spreadsheet, some of whom have left their positions or been 
fired. At the same time, Donegan has also suffered consequences for her efforts to 
give victims a platform from which to testify without fear of retaliation. She, too, has 
lost her job. 
Concerns about false allegations and the threat of retaliation for speaking up 
have long afflicted victims of sexual harassment and sexual assault, shaping the 
rhetorical spaces in which victim testimonies are expressed (or not expressed, as in 
the case of testimonial smothering) and heard (or not heard as in the case of 
testimonial quieting). In contrast, the focus of #MeToo is victim empowerment and 
solidarity, not vigilante justice. At Variety’s 2018 “Power of Women” New York 
event, Tarana Burke clarified the purpose of the movement: “Folks think it’s about 
naming and shaming, about taking down powerful men. But they’re wrong” (Noveck 
2018). “Me too” centers victims’ epistemic authority and agency. It does not call for 
the abandonment of existing legal channels established for responding to sexual 
harassment and sexual assault, but for their reform. 
A more significant concern is that #MeToo can become a self-serving 
mechanism that empowers some victims while exacerbating the marginalization of 
others. Many of the victims who have attracted public attention from the #MeToo 
movement are those who already hold considerable social and economic power. 
Despite the fact that the Black activist Tarana Burke had created the “me too” 
movement in 2006, it was only a decade later that the movement gained substantial 
public attention through the tweet of a white celebrity, Alyssa Milano. While Burke’s 
work aimed to center the voices of women and girls of color who had suffered from 
sexual abuse, the voices that have been centered in the media at the end of 2017 
are mostly those of affluent white women. Unfortunately, this is an all too common 
phenomenon. In “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and 
Violence Against Women of Color” (1991), Kimberlé Crenshaw emphasizes the need 
for attention to the intersectional nature of gender and race to address violence 
against women of color. On the one hand, the intersection of sexism and racism 
result in women of color experiencing domestic violence and sexual assault 
differently than white women. On the other hand, prevailing approaches to feminist 
and antiracist politics have marginalized women of color’s experiences with 
domestic violence and sexual assault. While Time’s article features voices from a 
diverse group of women and men, none of the narratives interrogates the 
intersectional nature of systems of oppression nor their role in the production of 
sexual harassment and sexual assault as a social pathology. It remains to be seen 
whether the #MeToo movement will do better.  
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Despite the dangers, #MeToo has great promise as a political movement. Its 
foundation in a process of mutual recognition offers the opportunity for the 
movement to alter the rhetorical spaces in which victims’ testimonies can be heard 
by empathetic listeners. Exposing the epistemic violence of testimonial quieting and 
testimonial smothering, #MeToo encourages both individual and collective instances 
of silence-breaking. Moreover, the influx of a polyphonic symphony of voices 
testifying to their experiences of sexual harassment and sexual violence can 
challenge the prevailing ideology of rape culture and shift the social imaginary 
shaping both how victims are perceived and how they perceive themselves. As 
Burke explains, “The power of using ‘me too’ has always been in the fact that it can 
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